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NRO & DIA/DOD REVIEWS  
COMPLETED

10 December 1962

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD**

**SUBJECT:** Meeting with the President's Foreign Intelligence  
Advisory Board, 1030, Friday, 7 December 1962

**PRESENT:** All Members of the Board except Dr. Land,  
plus General Carroll and the Undersigned

1. Dr. Killian welcomed Mr. McCone to the Board meeting, and said that he understood the considerable amount of work involved in putting together a report on the Cuban episode, and that the Board was assembling material on this subject in a variety of ways, but that the Director's report was the primary one for them.

2. Mr. McCone reported that immediately upon receipt of Dr. Killian's letter, it was transmitted to the USIB. The project of preparing a report for the President's Board was made a USIB responsibility, and thus the final report would not be that of the DCI alone or CIA. The USIB appointed a committee under the DCI's chairmanship composed of Generals Carter, Carroll and Blake and Mr. Hillsman--thus the responsibility for the final report will be that of the USIB. The Inspector General of CIA, whose staff has been augmented by representatives of the other intelligence agencies, has been designated as the responsible unit for producing the report, and has been working long hours on this matter. An input from the entire intelligence community has been received for the report.

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**TOP SECRET**

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2. Mr. McCone stated that the first mission of this working group was to analyze the sources of intelligence, the raw input that went into the finished intelligence. In this effort a study is being made of all different indications of the arrival of missiles in Cuba. The DCI pointed out that there were three prime sources of raw intelligence. The first was the classical clandestine agent, plus refugee information. The second was scientific and technical intelligence--SIGINT, including, particularly, COMINT and ELINT. The third prime source was photographic intelligence. An analysis is being made of how the photographic intelligence related to the other two sources, and a study is under way of the mechanism for gathering intelligence.

3. The DCI said that a second portion of the report would deal with the use made of the raw intelligence and how it entered into the analysis and estimating procedures. A determination would be made as to whether the various types of intelligence were given proper weight, and whether any raw intelligence had been overlooked. Particular attention would be given to the relative evaluations.

4. Mr. McCone said that the report would also deal with the transmission of intelligence to the policymakers. He noted that some restrictions had understandably been placed on the dissemination of some of the more sensitive intelligence so that the sources could be protected until the Government had an opportunity to act.

**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

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5. Mr. McCone advised the Board that the report which he would submit to them would have conclusions. (Dr. Killian nodded assent to this.) The DCI went on to say that the letter would seem to imply that no conclusions were necessary. On the other hand, the President had asked him directly for about the same type of a report. The DCI said that he thought the intelligence community had performed very, very well and, happily, had been able to detect the missiles and permit the U. S. Government to take the necessary action. He said he felt conclusions in this study were essential, and, if there were weaknesses in the system, we wanted to detect them because there are 40 other trouble spots in the world and we want to be sure to properly analyse them.

6. The DCI noted that there were two other studies made within CIA. He said there was the so-called Lehman Report, of which the Board had already received a copy. He noted that some of the analyses in the Lehman Report were not fully comprehensive, and therefore the Board should consider it only in its amended form. He noted that in addition to this the Inspector General had done an internal review of the CIA performance.

7. Mr. McCone said he then thought it would be important for the Board to get a fairly comprehensive picture of what had been obtainable from clandestine intelligence sources, and that consequently he had asked Mr. Helms to come prepared to present to the Board a review of the clandestine intelligence operations in Cuba. Mr. Helms then made a presentation explaining to the Board the various statistics presented on his chart (see photostat of chart attached), going into detail as to the meaning of each column and each number on the chart.

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/09/30 : CIA-RDP66R00638R000100030008-2

**TOP SECRET**

8. Mr. Murphy asked who was responsible for collection, Mr. Helms or Mr. Cline. The DCI replied that Mr. Helms was responsible for collection and Mr. Cline was responsible for analysis.

9. Dr. Baker asked how many of the resident agents were "our professionals" who were trained. Mr. Helms replied that there had been

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25X1C [REDACTED]

11. Mr. Clifford asked what was the difference in size between SAM's and MRBM's. General Carroll replied that one was 37 feet long and the other was 70 feet long. The DCI noted that there were five different categories of missiles ranging all the way from Frogs, or the Russian equivalent of the Honest John, up to the large missiles.

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25X1C [REDACTED]


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14. Mr. Gray said that there seemed to be confusion over one report.

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
He asked whether the interrogators at  understood the difference between the various types of missiles. General Carroll replied that the interrogators did know the different types of missiles, and had pictures and other material to help them in their interrogations.

15. Mr. Helms concluded his presentation by noting that a summary of all of the refugee and agent reports distributed between 1 July and 32 October showed that 

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


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20. Mr. Pace asked why  had been closed on 23 October, and Mr. Helms noted that all commercial air traffic to Cuba had stopped and so had the flow of the approximately 1,700 refugees per week. The DCI noted that it was now up for policy consideration as to whether Pan American should resume operations, and noted that KLM and other air lines would probably do so.

- 6 -

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

21. Dr. Killian said that he noted a 14 August order not to disseminate reports on Cuban missiles until they had been verified by NPIC. The DCI noted that this was a step to test the credibility of reports. He commented

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25X1C [REDACTED] General Carroll commented that he

thought this was a very necessary step in order to prevent the dissemination of false intelligence. Dr. Langer asked whether it involved much delay, and

Mr. Helms answered that it was only about one business day, and that the

25X1C checking was done very promptly. Dr. Baker asked concerning the restriction

25X1C [REDACTED] General

25X1C Carroll verified that this was the case, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The DCI said that this was clearly a policy which he supported. Dr. Baker

asked if there was a written agreement with the Cuban government on this

subject and Mr. Murphy replied that he was certain there was no provision in

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25X1C the treaty and no commitment to the Castro government. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Mr. Pace asked whether it might not produce good results, and the DCI replied that this would be difficult to answer.

22. Dr. Killian asked whether there were inhibitions in the use of intelligence from agents that prevented these reports from being indicators. The DCI said it was fair to say that there was an inhibition on the part of the analysts and estimators on the use of refugee and agent reports because of a feeling as to their general unreliability. He used the illustration of France in World War II, noting the difficulty of laymen in describing military equipment. He said that undoubtedly agent reports were not as heavily weighed as they might have been. General Carroll said he wanted to note at this point that an agent couldn't report what was not there, and that it was only in the second week of September that agents could have reported any hard facts about missiles, and made specific reference to the dissemination on 21 September, with hard copy on 27 September, of a specific report on missiles. [REDACTED] to the report originating with Castro's pilot about missiles in Pina [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

23. The DCI said that a review of 1,200 reports showed that only two had hard intelligence with respect to offensive missiles, and noted the skepticism with which analysts were likely to view such reports when the mass of evidence was to the contrary. He asked Mr. Kirkpatrick to comment



**TOP SECRET**

on this and the latter noted that beyond question there had been a failure of the analysts to give due attention to agent and refugee reports, and that one of the dangers in intelligence was the always present tendency to place too great reliance on one collection source such as photography or COMINT.

Mr. Murphy asked about the reason for the 14 August order requiring a check of all reports against photography, and the DCI said that this was specifically to get credibility into the reports.

24. Dr. Killian said there seemed to be a theme in all of the material that our Government felt the Russians would not put in offensive weapons. The DCI said that this was true and that it prevailed throughout the Government because we believed: first, that the Soviets had never done it before; second, that they knew we would discover it; and third, that they knew we would react violently. Basically this estimate was correct, certainly as far as the last two parts were concerned, and the Soviet estimators were wrong in assuming we would not react to it. The DCI said that the lesson we should learn is that we must never fall into a particular pattern of thinking. He noted that we didn't believe the Chinese would intervene in Korea, that in World War II we first had a tendency to downgrade the Japanese and Germans, and later we were unwilling to recognize the desperation of the Japanese and Germans.

25. Mr. Murphy then inquired as to whether any handicaps had been placed on the collection of intelligence about Cuba. The DCI replied no, and

**TOP SECRET**

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said that he didn't know precisely what happened after the Bay of Pigs except  
that we were in a state of shock. He said that in October<sup>1961</sup> when he came to  
Washington he found nothing being done. Refugees were arriving in the U. S.

but there was no [redacted] Shortly  
after he got here, the President asked him to come to the White House one  
evening for a discussion. The Attorney General was there--in fact this was  
the first time he had met the Attorney General. They discussed the problem  
and decided what to do. Then started the building of an organization from  
the grass roots. By 1 March 1962 [redacted] had been organized and an effort

[redacted] was built up over the first half of the year and will be  
intensified now. Dr. Killian asked if this was an on-going effort. The DCI  
answered in the affirmative and said that he and Secretary Rusk were  
personally working on [redacted]

[redacted] and that the Executive Committee of the  
National Security Council had reviewed this subject just night before last.

26. Mr. Clifford said that he felt there might be a Congressional  
investigation into this whole matter, particularly in view of the many  
Congressional statements on missiles. The DCI noted that there were several  
categories of missiles. Dr. Killian commented that Senator Keating was  
making a clear distinction and had been referring to offensive weapons. The  
DCI noted that Keating had nothing that the intelligence community didn't have.  
He simply jumped over the essential requirement of possessing hard information.

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He said that there undoubtedly was a great deal of information in Congress,

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[REDACTED] The DCI noted that on 10 August he had made an assumption, but that he didn't have the intelligence to back up this assumption.

27. Mr. Clifford asked as to the extent of dissemination of the DCI's views of 10 August. Mr. McCone replied that he had stated it to all of the principals on that day in the Secretary of State's office, and that he had mentioned it to them again on 21 and 22 August, and also to the President. He noted that there had been a meeting on 23 August and that the President had issued a National Security Action Memorandum on contingency planning. The DCI said he had communicated his continued concern to General Carter while he was in France, but that these were "think telegrams" and were not distributed outside of CIA. Dr. Killian asked if he had addressed any messages beyond CIA, and the DCI said it would have been wrong to go over the head of the Acting Director. Mr. Murphy asked whether the Deputy Director had brought it up in USIB, and General Carroll said there had been no mention. Mr. Gray said, "Then these telegrams had not gone anywhere outside CIA?" and the DCI replied, "No." Mr. Murphy asked whether the Director had discussed it on his telephone call to Washington, and the DCI noted that this

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[REDACTED] but that he had expressed concern again but did not order further dissemination. Mr. Murphy asked if General Carter didn't share his views, and the Director said that General Carter was not as concerned as he was, but that he did distribute the cables within the Agency.

**TOP SECRET**

25. Mr. Pace asked how much earlier a flight would have positively shown missiles. The Director replied that perhaps from 20 September on convoys on the road or equipment being moved in these areas would have caused great concern. He said there was nothing convincing until the 16 and 17 October flights, the photos from which were developed on the 18th. The 16 October flight had developed considerable misgivings. General Doolittle asked when the first low-level flight was, and General Carroll replied that it was on the 23rd. The DCI went on to say that the results of the 16 and 17 October flights provided the information which, in his opinion, was essential to convince the NATO and OAS countries. Mr. Pace asked the altitude of the U-2 flights and was told 70,000.

29. Dr. Baker asked if the 14 October flight was on its prescribed course. The DCI said that on 3 October DIA, concerned over agent reports, asked for a flight over Pinar del Rio. The Special Group considered this on 4 October, and the DCI expressed great concern at that time over the fact that we had not seen the western end of the island since 29 August. He noted that there was considerable worry that the SAM's were active and might shoot down a U-2. It was decided to fly across the two most advanced SAM sites, and these would be followed with two additional flights. This was taken to the President, who approved one flight and said that after it was completed he would consider the other two flights. The 14 October flight did get off course, but crossed the island where it was planned. General Carroll said that the confusion arises from a comparison of the flight plans and that SAC had been

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told to plan to cover four coordinates which had come from an agent. He noted that the SAC plan did not necessarily differ from others.

30. Dr. Baker asked if the judgment on the degree of readiness of the SAM sites was a coordinated opinion. The DCI said that after the 9 October meeting a decision was reached to transfer the operation from CIA to SAC. It was considered a hazardous mission if the SAM's were active; it was also considered that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was unsatisfactory. The NRO had considered the cover plan and Charyk had recommended to Gilpatric that SAC take over the operation. CIA protested, and the DCI was telephoned on the west coast but he believed the decision to transfer the operation was taken by the Secretary of Defense. Dr. Killian asked whether it had come up in the Special Group or had gone to the President. The DCI replied that the operation had been mentioned to the President by himself and Gilpatric on the 9th, but that he did not think the decision to transfer had ever gone to the President. He asked Mr. Kirkpatrick if this was correct and the latter replied that it was his impression that the final decision had been reached in a meeting in Mr. Bundy's office. The DCI noted that the decision had not made much difference in the results. General Carroll said he wanted to make sure that everybody understood that SAC had flown where they intended to fly. Dr. Baker commented that the activation of the SA-2 depended on the route of the aircraft.

**TOP SECRET**

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31. Dr. Killian asked if all of the U-2 flights were considered by the Special Group. The DCI said that at the first of each month the Special Group considered all flights. He noted that there were about 500 peripheral flights plus two U-2's over Cuba each month. In September he said there was grave concern that a flight might be knocked down. There was some timidity because of two U-2 incidents and an attitude of caution was prevalent at the 4 and 9 October meetings. The DCI then read the chronology of the U-2 flights. (Mr. Coyne asked for a copy of this.) Mr. Gray picked up a phrasing in the U-2 chronology referring to missile sites and the DCI noted that this was referring to SAM's and the BANES surface-to-surface missile. Dr. Killian asked General Carroll if he wished to make any comment on this and the latter declined.

32. Dr. Baker asked who made the requirements for surveillance of SAM sites and General Carroll noted that COMOR wanted to cover those portions of Cuba that had been clouded over, and that since the west had been covered, they wanted to cover other parts. Dr. Baker asked whether there was a requirement for continuing surveillance of SAM's and General Carroll noted that this was not thought to be necessary. Dr. Baker asked if there was a prohibition on overflying Havana and General Carroll replied that this applied only to low-level flights. Mr. Pace asked why low-level flights were necessary and General Carroll said this was to supplement the U-2 photography, and the DCI added that more precise detail was needed in the event we decided


to invade. Mr. Pace asked if there had been requests for low-level flights for some time and the DCI said that CIA and the military had been making such requests. General Carroll noted that low-level flights were not so vulnerable and that we wanted to know whether the SA-2's were the A or B version. The DCI commented that on 23 August he had phoned back from the west coast and asked for low-level flights to get technical intelligence. This was passed orally to the Special Group where Defense felt that it was better to get the read-out on BANES first. CIA requested low-level flights in writing, but these were delayed by weather. The DCI reiterated that these low-level flights were for technical intelligence and not pre-invasion purposes.

33. Mr. Murphy then turned to the Central Intelligence Bulletin and noted the divergency in estimates on Bloc personnel in Cuba today, and asked whether everybody was in agreement on this. General Carroll replied that all intelligence agencies were using the same sources; all were working on estimates and it was primarily a matter of interpretation. The DIA estimate

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Mr. Murphy noted that the public was under the impression the Russians had left, and the DCI said that the policymakers know how many Russians are there and that he, personally, was very discouraged at the Russian military

strength in Cuba. Dr. Killian asked if we were moving into another period of uncertainty as to exactly what was going on in Cuba. Mr. Helms noted



34. At this point Mr. Helms and General Carroll left and the Director went on to other subjects covered in the attached memoranda.

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick  
Executive Director

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